



ITRI

**High-level assessment on OECD Annex II risks
in Wa territory in Myanmar**

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Front Cover: Panorama of Tachileik, Shan State, Myanmar.

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Figure 1 - In Red, territory occupied and administered by the United Wa State Army/Party (source: Burma News International, July 10 2013).



The Wa territory is divided in two areas (see Section I for details);

- The Northern Wa State where the capital of the UWSA, Pangkham (or Panghsang), is located, and where presence of UWSA is partly recognised by the Myanmar Government.
- The Southern Wa State, or 171st Wa military region, where the presence of UWSA is not accepted by the Myanmar Government.

Introduction, scope and methodology

The following report presents the results of a desk-based high-level assessment on OECD Annex II risks for the Wa territory in Eastern Myanmar, conducted by Synergy Global Consulting.

Myanmar (Burma) operated as a republic following independence in 1948, and came under military rule in 1962. Recent years have seen some degree of reform as the country adopted a new Constitution and power was officially transferred to a civilian government in 2011. However, the Myanmar military still has control over the Parliament¹ and retains the exclusive management of military affairs. The ethnic conflict in the country has been ongoing since the independence and many ethnic armed groups like the UWSA are still active today.

The objective of the assessment was to evaluate the general political, social and military environment in the Wa State, as well as assess the circumstances relating to Annex II of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

OECD Due Diligence Guidance Annex II risks include serious human rights abuses, the involvement of non-state armed groups, illegal taxation, extortion and control by private/public security forces, bribery and fraudulent misrepresentation of the origin of minerals, money laundering, and payment of taxes, fees and royalties due to government. The study also focuses on the analysis of political and security dynamics of the mining sector in Wa State.

The report is divided into three sections:

- **Section I:** provides an overview of the Wa territory, the United Wa State Army and Party, the state of government recognition and their relations to other groups and foreign countries.
- **Section II:** provides an overview of publicly available information on the UWSA/P leaders and their alleged business affiliations, including in the mining sector, and also a general overview of the mining industry in Wa State.
- **Section III:** provides a high-level assessment of available information on OECD Annex II risks in the Wa territory, and evidence of human rights abuses in general.

The information gathered in this report has relied on desk-based research of relevant publicly available secondary sources published by experts familiar with Myanmar politics and society. The findings and any gaps of the information provided would need to be corroborated with an on-the-ground assessment. Other limitations include the lack of available information about the mining industry in Wa State, as well as the financial structure of the UWSA/P and the business environment.

SECTION I: Overview of the Wa territory, United Wa State Army and United Wa State Party

This section highlights the main findings regarding the political and security environment in the Wa State, as well as the current state of recognition of the UWSA and the Wa State from the central government.

The Wa territory, also called Wa Stateⁱⁱ, refers to two areas located in North-eastern Myanmar along the border with China and Thailand administered by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and its political wing the United Wa State Party (UWSP). The UWSA is primarily a separatist organisation, seeking autonomy from the central government of Myanmarⁱⁱⁱ.

Those areas are mostly populated by the Wa people^{iv}, an ethnic group closely related to the Chinese^v, and some Wa also live outside the area controlled by the UWSA (in Myanmar's Shan and Kachin States, and in Yunnan province in China).

The United Wa State Army (UWSA): History and state of government recognition

The ethnic conflict in Myanmar has been ongoing since the independence in the late 1940s. Most ethnic minorities organized themselves politically and militarily against the central government which is mainly controlled by the Bamar ethnic group and which became particularly hostile and violent after a military junta took power in Rangoon in 1962^{vi}.

Elements of geographical and administrative context:

Myanmar is made up of 14 main administrative divisions, including 7 Regions and 7 States equal in rights and status. The Regions are located in the main valleys and are mostly populated by the Bamar (the country's main ethnic group), while the States are mostly located in the mountainous border areas and populated by ethnic minorities. The Wa territory is located in Eastern Shan State (the Shan are Myanmar's most important ethnic minority). "Territory" is used in this paper as a general term and is not an official designation.

"Wa State" is the unofficial term used by the UWSA/P to designate the territories under its control.

The history of the Wa resistance is slightly different compared to other ethnic armed groups. For many years Wa fighters represented a large part of the Communist Party of Burma's (CPB) ranks which had its headquarters in Panghsang, in Wa territory. The CPB, which fought the central government from 1949 to 1989 and controlled a large area in Eastern Shan State, had a large majority of its troops made up of ethnic minorities^{vii}. Shortly after the CPB collapsed in 1989, the United Wa State Army was created by Wa military commanders to ensure the Wa remain out of government control. In the same year the newly created armed group benefited from other major political events taking place in Rangoon^{viii} and became the first armed group to sign a ceasefire with the government, which is still in place today (see below).

The UWSA has long demanded the status of full State for the territories under its control^{ix}, which has never been granted by the central government. However, the ceasefire agreement signed in 1989

granted the Wa autonomy in what was then called “Wa Special Region” or “Special Region 2”^x. The ceasefire deal also stipulated that troops of the central government could not enter areas under control of the UWSA^{xi}.

After the 2007 Saffron Revolution^{xii}, the central government decided to launch its Roadmap to Democracy and promulgated a new Constitution in 2008. The document makes no mention of a Special Region, but instead recognizes a Self-administered Division for the Wa, covering a smaller area than the UWSA currently controls (see below), but that would grant them a large degree of autonomy. The Constitution does not explicitly mention the UWSA/P as official local governing structure, but establishes that a self-administered area shall have its own “leading body”^{xiii}. Nevertheless, the UWSA does not accept the status of Self-administered Division, and demands the status of State as well as more land area^{xiv}.

Despite the disagreement on the nature of the Wa territory, the UWSA is not demanding a fully separate and independent sovereign state^{xv}. In 2011, they signed an agreement not to secede from the Union of Myanmar^{xvi}, and the ceasefire first signed in 1989 with the central government was renewed. The UWSA and the central government have been holding regular talks since then, and two ministries of the central government, the education department and the border development affairs department, have representatives in Wa State^{xvii}.

The UWSA is today Myanmar’s largest non-state armed group with an estimated 30,000 fighters as well as 10,000 auxiliaries^{xviii}.

The UWSA’s Southern command

A main source of tension between the UWSA and the central government rests on the geographic definition of the Wa territory. The Myanmar Constitution grants 6 townships (Hopang, Mongma, Panwai, Nahpan, Metman and Panghsang^{xix}) for the Wa Self-Administered Division, however the UWSA occupies a wider territory. In the North-east, it claims sovereignty on several more areas (namely Mongpawk and Mongphen), but the main issue remains the armed group’s positions in South Shan State, on the Thai border (the 171st Wa military region, see map). After a brief alliance between the UWSA and the central government to fight a powerful drug cartel in Shan State in 1996, the UWSA decided to stay in the territories it conquered in order to benefit from a major trade/traffic route through Thailand. In the late 1990s, the armed group relocated near 80,000 Wa peasants from the Northern territory to the South^{xx} (whether the peasants were willing to move or not remains unclear, but one report from the Lahu National Development Organisation charges the UWSA with forced relocation of its people, with dramatic consequences for the local population of the Southern area^{xxi}). The presence of the UWSA in those areas is not recognized by the central government, who has demanded on several occasions that they return to the North^{xxii}. A report of the Asia Foundation from June 2014 suggests there is a difference between the Northern territory, where the UWSA’s positions are clearly demarcated, and the Southern command where territorial distinctions of areas ruled by the UWSA have generally faded overtime, with armed actors in some cases maintaining explicit or implicit agreements for rights to maintain bases and checkpoints in certain areas^{xxiii}.

Rising tensions since 2009

There has been no direct combat between the UWSA and the central government since the signature of the ceasefire agreement in 1989^{xxiv}. However after 2008 the government’s wish to extend its control on the whole Burmese territory has led to a rise in tensions with ethnic armed

groups^{xxv}. In 2009, the central government launched its Border Guard Force (BGF) scheme in an attempt to absorb ethnic militia groups into the Myanmar Army^{xxvi}. The groups that had signed a ceasefire were offered to transform into battalions under command of the Myanmar Army. Most armed groups, including the UWSA^{xxvii}, rejected the government's offer fearing they would lose all autonomy.

In response to the armed groups' refusal, the Myanmar military decided to launch a major offensive against the Kokang rebellion in their small territory just North of Wa State, until then controlled by a Kokang militia named MNDAA, but taken by government forces in August 2009^{xxviii}. In 2011, the central government put an end to a 17-year old ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA, a separatist group from the northern most Kachin State of Myanmar, and with some interests in northern Shan State) and launched an offensive against them. Consequently, the UWSA reinforced its military posts both in its Northern and Southern territories amid concerns that the military could focus its attention on Wa territory^{xxix}.

After 2011 however the government's efforts to transform the armed groups in BGF faded in favour of negotiating a nationwide ceasefire^{xxx}.

Administration of the Wa territory

The Wa resistance is organized like most ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, with an armed wing (the UWSA) and a political wing (the UWSP). The two wings are in fact extremely interconnected and share the same leaders (see II). The ethnic organization is the *de facto* government of the territories under its control, and the administration is modelled after the Chinese governance structure, with a central committee and a single Party (the UWSP)^{xxxi}. The Wa authority built infrastructure, established an administrative system, generated revenue from legal and possibly illegal activity, and maintained an armed force that holds the territory together^{xxxii}.

Links to other armed groups

The UWSA is known to maintain a close relationship with its neighbouring ethnic armed group NDAA^{xxxiii} (National Democratic Alliance Army^{xxxiv}, also called the Mongla Army). The two ethnic groups released a joint-statement on October 2014, in which they shared their concerns about recent clashes between the Shan-State Army South (another ethnic armed group in Shan State) and the Myanmar military^{xxxv}.

On the 21st of February 2015 in front of the Press, Lieutenant-General Mya Tun Oo of the Myanmar Army accused the UWSA of helping the neighbouring Kokang rebels in the recent violence that struck the area, supplying them with weapons^{xxxvi}. The UWSA publicly denied any involvement in the Kokang events on the 27th of February^{xxxvii}.

In early May 2015, the Wa hosted a conference in Panghsang bringing together twelve ethnic armed groups^{xxxviii}, some of them such as MNDAA and KIA currently in active conflict with government troops. The UWSA's leader, Bao Youxiang (see below), declared that a ceasefire without a peace plan was worthless, before calling for a "full recognition of the Wa State"^{xxxix}. Spokesperson Aung Myint also pledged solidarity with Palaung, Arakanese and Kokang rebels in their fight against the Myanmar Army^{xl}.

Relationship with China

Generally speaking, China is ubiquitous in Wa State. The UWSA/P conducts its activities in Chinese, most commodities come from China and the currency in use is the Renminbi^{xli}. According to Crisis

Group International, twelve of the top UWSA commanders are ethnically Chinese Wa^{xlii}. The border between Wa State and Yunnan province in China is also quite porous, and many Burmese-Wa live in China and Chinese nationals live in Wa State^{xliii}.

Numerous reports tend to show that the Chinese government has long provided a significant economic and military support to the United Wa State Army^{xliv}, even though China denies backing any ethnic militias in Myanmar^{xlv}. Such a support is due to historical, cultural and economic ties with the Wa people, as well as strategic reasons.

According to Bertil Lintner, journalist and expert on Burma, China's interest in supporting the Wa is to perpetuate the status quo and have a UWSA strong enough to deter any military offensive against the Wa from the central government^{xlvi}. The People's Republic would likely be concerned about having to deal with a potential refugee crisis that an open conflict between the UWSA and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) may cause. Reports also suggest that, by supporting the UWSA, China has a leverage to use in any future negotiation with Myanmar's Government^{xlvii}.

According to a report from IHS Jane's Intelligence Review in December 2012, China has provided the UWSA with advanced weapons including surface-to-air missiles and armoured vehicles^{xlviii}. Another report from the same source in April 2013 says that China has sent helicopter gunships to the UWSA^{xlix}.

Despite the support to the UWSA, China and Myanmar maintain cordial relations, which is illustrated by strong bilateral trade and investmentⁱ. Both countries benefit from the cooperation, as China is a major supplier of goods for Myanmar and Myanmar holds a geostrategic significance for China's energy supply (Shwe Gas pipeline), and supplies China's smelting facilities with growing quantities of cassiterite, apparently mined in Wa State (see below). China's priority is to secure its own economic development and therefore encourages regional stabilityⁱⁱ.

SECTION II: UWSA leaders and their alleged business affiliations

This section provides a short description of publicly available information on UWSA and UWSP leaders and their business affiliations, including in the mining sector, and also a general overview of the mining industry in Wa State.

Bao You Xiang

Current chairman of the UWSA/P. Born in a Northern Wa village, he rose through the ranks of the Communist Party of Burma, before participating in its collapse by mutinying against the party's leadership^{lii}, and quickly became one of the leaders of the newly-created UWSA. He allegedly owns the Myanmar Mayflower Group^{liii}, and also holds a substantial interest in hotel and casino operations in cities in the southern Chinese province of Yunnan^{liv}. He is wanted in the United States on drug charges. Ho Chun Ting, his son-in-law, is the principal owner and managing director of Yangon Airways and chairman of Tetkham Co Ltd that runs a chain of hotels^{lv}.

Xiao Ming Liang

Current Vice-chairman of the UWSA/P. No business affiliations found.

Aung Myint

Secretary of the central office and spokesperson of the UWSA/P. No business affiliations found.

Zhao Zhongdan

Chief of staff of the UWSA. No business affiliations found.

Wei Xuegang

Commander of the Southern military area and founder of the Hong Pang Group. He was born in China and is wanted in Thailand and the US for drug charges^{lvi}.

The Hong Pang Group / Thawda Win Company

Founded by Wei Xuegang and the UWSA in 1998 with funds from the drug trade^{lvii}, it is a Wa owned conglomerate sometimes referred to as the UWSA commercial wing^{lviii}. It is involved in construction, agriculture, gems and minerals, petroleum, electronics and communications, distilleries and department stores. The Hong Pang Group is based in Panghsang with offices also outside of Wa State, in Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio, Tachilek and Mawlamyine. The group officially changed its name to Thawda Win Company in 2012^{lix}.

The Myanmar Mayflower Group

Another Wa-controlled company, which owns the country's third biggest bank.

Drug trade as source of financing for the UWSA

For many years, the UWSA has been notorious for its opium production, which helped finance the organisation. However a total ban on opium production and poppy field cultivation has been implemented by the UWSP in 2005 to comply with international pressure, and is still in place today^{lx}. Aung Myint, spokesperson of the UWSA, has publicly said that the group is "wholeheartedly engaged in the fight against drug-dealing", adding that since 2005, there have been no poppy fields and no poppy plants in the region, information that has been backed up by a UNODC report^{lxi}. However, a switch to other narcotics has been observed and the US Department of State, in its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report from March 2015, mentions that the production of

methamphetamine by the UWSA remains an “issue of great concern for Thailand”^{lxii}. The output of methamphetamine by producers of the United Wa State Army is alleged to have increased dramatically in recent years, and is supposed to have made up for financial losses caused by the sharp decline in opium production^{lxiii}.

Weapons trade as source of financing for the UWSA

The UWSA has been identified by the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis as the most productive illegal weapons trader in Myanmar’s armed ethnic groups^{lxiv}. The report shows that small weapons are manufactured in Wa State and sold across South-east Asia.

Mining industry overview in Wa State

The UWSA seems to be aware of the potential for mining on its territory. In the several rounds of talks it has held with the government, the issue of minerals has come up several times. On April 3rd 2010, the UWSA issued an 8-point proposal to the government, one of them being *to maintain businesses, especially mining operations, as is*. On October 1st 2011, the UWSA issued a 14-point proposal, one of them requesting the *rights for exploration of minerals and natural resources*^{lxv}. In an interview with Democratic Voice of Burma in 2014, spokesperson Aung Myint said that since the opium ban the UWSA had been substituting the narcotic with rubber, tea and other cash crops, and added: “we use the best of our limited knowledge to mine minerals”^{lxvi}. An article from February 2014 reported clashes between the UWSA and the Shan armed group SSA-S in South Shan State over control of a gold mine^{lxvii}.

Two of Hong Pang’s subsidiaries are Hong Pang Gems and Jewellery (based in Hong Kong) and Hong Pang Mining Company (Based in Rangoon). No information on these companies seems to be publicly available, but the Hong Pang mining company is still listed on the US Department of Treasury’s list of Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers^{lxviii}. The Hong Pang Group also has a subsidiary called Myanmar Dagaung Co Ltd, which is specialized in jade mining and operates in Kachin State.

Cassiterite production in Myanmar has jumped in the last couple years to reach 30,000 tonnes in 2014^{lxix}, or about 8% of the world production^{lxx}. Reports agree to say that most of Myanmar’s production comes from the Wa State and more specifically the tin mines in the locality of Man Maw in the Panghsang Township^{lxxi} (Panghsang being the *de facto* capital of the Wa State). This area is both in the territory occupied by the UWSA and in the recognised Wa Self-administered Division. The Man Maw area has been under control of the UWSA since 1989 and has not been reached by violent conflict since then^{lxxii}.

Given the UWSA’s high level of control over the economy in Wa State, his role as *de facto* local government and the frequent mentions of the mining sector in its negotiations with the central government, it is likely that the mining industry is subjected to taxes and finances to some degree the UWSA/P.

A smaller volume of cassiterite is also produced in Southern Myanmar, in Tanintharyi Region, an area under government control which is not affected by non-state armed groups. Examples of important mine sites in this Region are Hermyingyi mine or Heinda mine.

SECTION III: OECD Annex II supply chain related risks in Wa State

This section analyses risks cited by the OECD Due Diligence Guidance of Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas and human rights abuses in general.

Support to non-state armed groups

Given that the UWSA acts as a local government and has a high degree of involvement in the local economy, mining activities are likely to contribute financially to a non-state armed group through collection of taxes.

Child soldiers

Despite the UWSA agreeing to discuss an action plan to end the use of child soldiers in 2007 and their assertion that they have not recruited children since the 1989 cease-fire, it has been reported that a military training was still being conducted in primary schools and that children under 18 were enrolled for combatant and non-combatant positions^{lxxiii}. In September 2014, the UNICEF still listed the UWSA as an armed group using child soldiers^{lxxiv}.

Land confiscation

An article from *The Straits Times* reported cases of land confiscation by UWSA troops on the Thai border (Southern command), and mentions an incident when a man claiming his land had been taken was allegedly shot dead by UWSA troops in Tachileik^{lxxv}. The Shan Human Rights Foundation also charges the UWSA with numerous cases of land grabbing on the Thai border^{lxxvi}.

Money Laundering

The Myanmar Mayflower Group, which owns one of the biggest bank in the country, is still on the United States list of Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern^{lxxvii}.

SUMMARY

A high-risk area, as established by the amended European Union definition, is an area in a state of armed conflict, with presence of widespread violence, collapse of civil infrastructure, fragile post-conflict areas as well as areas of weak or non-existent governance and security, such as failed states, characterised by widespread and systematic violations of human rights, as established under international law.

- The UWSA is today Myanmar's largest non-state armed group with an estimated 30,000 fighters as well as 10,000 auxiliaries, and it benefits from non-official Chinese support. It has had a ceasefire with the central Myanmar government since 1989.
- The Wa territory is made up of two areas, one in the North along the border with China, and one in the South along the border with Thailand. The UWSA's autonomy in the Northern area was recognised in 1989 when the "Wa Special Region" was created, while the armed group's presence in the South is not recognised. The name "Wa State" is how the UWSA/UWSP refers to both of these areas.
- Myanmar adopted a new Constitution in 2008 which makes no mention of the "Wa Special Region", but instead establishes a "Wa Self-administered Division" with different territorial boundaries than the UWSA currently controls. The adoption of the Constitution has not translated in any change of the situation on the ground.
- Even though the UWSA provides some level of governance and security on the areas under its control, the Wa territory remains an area controlled by a non-state armed group. The central government's presence in the territory is limited to a few civil servants, and the Myanmar military cannot, under the terms of the ceasefire, enter areas under control of the UWSA.
- The armed group's relations with the central government have been tense since 2009 as its leaders demand the status of State, which the central government has not been willing to give so far. The group also recently pledged solidarity with armed groups currently in active conflict with the government.
- The UWSA is allegedly an organization involved in drug trafficking and money-laundering, and some of its leaders are wanted in the United States.
- The Wa territory has an important tin deposit in its Northern area, near the *de facto* capital Panghsang, and the production of cassiterite in this area has jumped in the last couple years. Quantities of cassiterite produced from Wa are much larger than from the entirely unrelated Tanintharyi Region in Southern Myanmar which is under government control and are not affected by non-state armed groups.
- Given that the UWSA acts as a local government, that it keeps a high degree of involvement in the local economy, and that it mentioned minerals extraction in its talks with the central Myanmar government, it is likely that mining activities in the area contribute to some degree to the UWSA's financial resources.

End notes

ⁱ The Constitution establishes that 25% of the Parliament seats go to the military. In the current legislature, the vast majority of the remaining seats belong to the USDP, the party created to support the military.

ⁱⁱ The designation of the Wa territory as “State” is source of controversy with the Myanmar government, see later in text. The area is also referred to as “Special Region 2”.

ⁱⁱⁱ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/wa.htm>

^{iv} The Wa people living in Wa State are estimated to be 600,000. Other ethnic groups in Wa territory include Shan, Lahu, Palaung, Akha, Kokang, Kachin and Han Chinese (*Ethnic politics in Burma*, Ashley South, 2008, p142)

^v *The Wa are an ethnic Chinese mountain tribe whose main religion is animist. The Wa is one of the 135 officially recognised ethnic groups of Myanmar. The Wa tribe is also present in China and Thailand though in lesser numbers. The total population of ethnic Wa in Myanmar is estimated about 800,000 people. The working language of UWSA is Chinese. The Chinese influence in trade, industrial establishments, currency, culture, telephone network, administration as well in other fields is predominant.* <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1417>

^{vi} BBC News, Myanmar profile – Overview, 31 March 2015.

^{vii} *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma*, Bertil Lintner, 1990, p35.

^{viii} The 8888 uprising and the new military coup.

^{ix} Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies, *Tensions and concerns in Shan State*, Analysis Paper No. 7, March 2013.

^x *The Wa Authority and Good Governance, 1989–2007*, Ronald D. Renard, Journal of Burma Studies Volume 17, Number 1, June 2013.

^{xi} <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/wa.htm>

^{xii} Technically not a revolution but a series of pro-democracy demonstrations in 2007.

^{xiii} Constitution of Myanmar, 2008. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

^{xiv} CSIS (CogitAsia), *United Wa State Army – The Challenge to Peace*, 11 March 2013.

^{xv} Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Tracking the source of ‘Weapon Providers’ for NE Rebels, Namrata Goswami, 7 November 2013.

^{xvi} *By Force of Arms, Armed Ethnic Groups in Burma*, Paul Keenan, 2013.

^{xvii} Democratic Voice of Burma, *Civil servants return to Wa region*, Min Lwin, 26 April 2012.

^{xviii} Myanmar Peace Monitor, UWSA.

<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/constitution/169-uwsa>

^{xix} Constitution of Myanmar, 2008. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

^{xx} *By Force of Arms, Armed Ethnic Groups in Burma*, Paul Keenan, 2013, p111.

^{xxi} Unsettling Moves, Lahu National Development Organisation, April 2002.

<http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/Shan-docs.pdf> (p9)

^{xxii} Stratfor, *Myanmar: The United Wa State Army's Uncertain Future*, 22 July 2013.

^{xxiii} Asia Foundation, *Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar's Contested Regions*, Kim Jolliffe, June 2014.

^{xxiv} Although the website Myanmar Peace Monitor judges that there has been sporadic clashes with the Myanmar army since 2009, there has been no official announcement of fighting by either side.

^{xxv} Transnational Institute, *Burma's Cease-fires at Risk*, Tom Kramer, Peace and Security briefing No. 1, Sept 2009.

^{xxvi} <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/border-guard-force>

^{xxvii} CSIS (CogitAsia), *United Wa State Army – The Challenge to Peace*, 11 March 2013.

^{xxviii} *More fighting feared after thousands flee Burma*, AFP, 27 August 2009.

- xxix Stratfor, *Myanmar: The United Wa State Army's Uncertain Future*, 22 July 2013.
- xxx *By Force of Arms, Armed Ethnic Groups in Burma*, Paul Keenan, 2013.
- xxxi Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Tracking the source of 'Weapon Providers' for NE Rebels, Namrata Goswami, 7 November 2013.
- xxxii *The Wa Authority and Good Governance, 1989–2007*, Ronald D. Renard, Journal of Burma Studies Volume 17, Number 1, June 2013.
- xxxiii <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/component/content/article/57-stakeholders/169-uwsa>
- xxxiv Not to confuse with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army of the Kokang People.
- xxxv Burma News International, *UWSA and NDAA Issue Joint Statement About Fighting Between Government and SSPP/SSA Forces*, 10 October 2014.
- xxxvi <http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/politics/military-says-ethnic-groups-supplying-kokang-rebels>
- xxxvii The Irrawaddy, *Govt Wrong to Suggest Wa, China Involvement in Kokang Conflict: UWSA*, Lawi Weng, 27 February 2015.
- xxxviii Restoration Council of Shan State, Kachin Independence Organization, Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization, New Mon State Party, The United Wa State Army, Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA), Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)/Shan State Army (SSA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang) and National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla).
- xxxix <http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/politics/peace-deal-worthless-uwsa-head>
- xl The Irrawaddy, *At Ethnic Summit, UWSA Backs Rebels in Conflict With Govt*, Lawi Weng, 1 May 2015.
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- xliii French Institute for International Relations, *De Kunming à Mandalay: la nouvelle "Route de Birmanie"*, 2010.
- xliv Marc Simms, Human Security Centre, Security and Defence, Issue 3, No. 7, 10th September, 2014.
- xlv The Irrawaddy, *China Denies Providing Arms to Wa Army*, Patrick Boehler, 28 January 2013.
- xlvi <http://www.irrawaddy.org/magazine/wa.html>
- xlvii The Irrawaddy, *Two Decades on the Trail of the Wa*, Thierry Falise, 22 October 2013.
- xlviii Voice of America, *With Burma in Mind, China Quietly Supports Wa Rebels*, Daniel Schearf, 25 January 2013.
- xlix <https://www.stratfor.com/image/chinese-assistance-myanmar-insurgent-group>
- ¹ Huffington Post, *The Impact of Energy on China/Myanmar Relations*, Daniel Wagner, 4 April 2015.
- ² Institute for Security and Development Policy, *Sino-Myanmar Relations: Security and Beyond*, Niklas Swanström, June 2012.
- ³ Time, *Soldiers of Fortune*, Andrew Marshall and Anthony Davis, 16 December 2002.
- ⁴ Courrier International, Bao Youxiang, seigneur de la drogue, Waitan Huabao, 24 August 2005.
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